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Distinctions between implicit and explicit forms of knowledge are frequently
invoked by second language researchers. However, there are competing uses of these
terms, and their relationship to similar distinctions made in cognitive psychology
between implicit and explicit leaming and memory is not always clear. This paper
aims to clarify the conceptual basis for such distinctions by comparing their use in
theories of automaticity (Logan, 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 7977); skill learning
(Andersoru 1983) and implicit learning (Reber, 1989. 1993) with their use in some
recent cognitive theories of second language leaming (Mclaughlin, 1987; Krashen,
1985; Ellis, 1993). It is claimed that, in theorizing second language cognition, one
needs to distinguish between levels of description of the cognitive system (Bunge
1973), but to infer relations between them. These are the neurophysiological level (of
memory), the representational level, (of knowledge) and the information processing
level (of cognitive function and leaming). The implicit /explicit distinction refers to
an operational distinction between task conditions at the level of cognitive function.
Vertical inferences across levels must be related to the task conditions whereby the
explicit/implicit distinction is implemented. This is largely the case in experimental
research in cognitive psychology, but not so in much SLA theorizing, which assumes
a distinction at one level without adequately specifying the inferences made about its
vertical relation to other levels, thus creating terminological confusion.
INTRODUCTION
A number of second language researchers (e.g., Bialystok,7979, 1.982; Ellis
1,990, L993a; Krashen, 1985; Mclaughlin, Rossman & Mcleod, 1,983;
Sharwood-Smith, 1981, 1991) refer to distinctions between types of
knowledge using the terms 'implicit' and 'explicit'. However, it is not always
clear how their different uses of these terms relate to each other, or to similar
distinctions between implicit versus explicit memory/ and implicit versus
explicit learning which are made in cognitive psychology (e.9., Schacter, 1987;
Unioersity of Hawai'i Working Papers in ESL,Yol.12, No. 1, Fall -1993, pp.99-138.
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Reber, 1989). The non-complementary nature of the different constructs that
researchers invoke by using these terms is made clear when, for example, the
issue of the interface between the two knowledge forms is addressed.
Bialystok (1979, 1982) and Ellis (1.993a) both claim that explicit knowledge can
'feed in' to implicit knowledge. In contrast Krashen (1985) proposes that
similar knowledge constructs (acquired, unconscious knowledge versus
learned, conscious knowledge) are non-interfaced. Reber (1989) also supports
a non-interface position but claims that explicit learning can have a negative
effect on the development of implicit representations. In contrast, Mathews et
al. (1989) claim that the knowledge base established during learning is the
result of a synergetic, mutually complementary cycle of implicit to explicit to
implicit modes of learning. The interface issue is just one example of the
conceptual conflicts and incompatibilities that are masked by superficially
similar distinctions between implicit and explicit knowledge.
My aim in this paper is to clarify the conceptual basis for such
distinctions by comparing their use in theories of automaticity (Logan, 1988;
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1,977); skill learning (Anderson, 1983) and implicit
learning (Reber 1989,1993) with their use in some recent cognitive theories of
second language learning (Ellis, '1,993a; Krashen, 1985; Mclaughlin, 1987). In
the first section of this paper I distinguish between three levels of description
in the construction of theories of cognition. I then describe how inferences
about the organization of these levels can be made on the basis of contrasting
performance under implicit and explicit task conditions. In the second section
I discuss the extent to which it is possible to compare models of the relations
between these levels, and to claim that a distinction between forms of
knowledge appropriate to one research question can be appropriated for the
purposes of theorizing a different area. In the final section I discuss these
issues in the context of recent claims (Ellis 1993a, b) for a role for implicit
knowledge in second language syllabus design.
THE PROBLEM OF LEVELS IN INFERRING IMPLICIT PROCESSES
There are levels of idealization and description in the analysis of cognition,
(Bunge 1.973; Changeux & Dehaene, '1.989; Eimas & Galaburda, L989), in
particular those cognitive processes responsible for second language
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acquisition, as there are in the analysis of language (Lyons, 1968), or of the
visual system (Marr, 1982). By this I do not mean that the cognitive system
itself is rigidly compartmentalized along the lines of the levels I will describe,
but rather that our descriptions of the workings of the system are appropriate
to the particular problems we address by describing and analyzing it.
Consider, for example, an analogy to the traffic system of a major city. For
traffic control purposes one might study the movement and density of traffic
at certain times along particular routes, and subsequently decide whether to
broaden certain roadways, or reduce the intervals between stoP signs at
intersections. For civic planning purposes, perhaps, one would study the
amount of available parking space and its proximity to centers of activity like
shopping malls, cinemas etc., and subsequently recommend the need for
additional parking lots. Describing traffic at the traffic flow level and at the
parking lot level requires a characterization of different features of the overall
traffic system. Of course, the two levels interac! parking is imPortant to traffic
flow, and traffic flow is important to parking, but they require different
observational notations, as do descriptions of the mental activity that takes
place during information processing, and descriptions of the neural
architecture of memory.
The problems we address by analyzing the cognitive system also
predispose us to adopt a particular level of idealization, or abstraction away
from neurophysiology and the facts of cellular composition. Take, for
example, the analogy to the traffic system again. This involves i) the facts of
the amount of available parking space, ii) the facts of the numbers of vehicles
occupying the space or in transit, and iii) the facts of movement between
places at certain times, which give rise to the notions 'rush hour', 'traffic hold
up', etc. This latter level, like the description of human information
processing, requires a characterization of phenomena of a different order of
abstraction than the first level, which is concerned essentially with available
parking space (memory), or the second level, which is concerned with the
nature of its occupancy (knowledge).
The notion of levels, then, is a consequence of the need to circumscribe
the phenomena which can be usefully studied for a particular purpose, using
experimental tasks appropriate to that PurPose and level (Bunge 1973; Marr
1982). As such, distinguishing between levels of description is in no way
oppositional to the view that memory and representations are distributed
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throughout the entire cognitive system, or the view that information is
processed in parallel, rather than in a linearly serial fashion (Changeux &
Dehaen, 1989; Eimas & Galaburda, 1989; Hintzman, 1986; McClelland &
Rumelhart, 1985; Morris, 1989). Levels, that is, do not correspond to divisions
and hierarchies in grey matter; they are simply consequences of the limited
scope and task specificity of our observations of mental phenomena during
the process of building models of the cognitive system.
In the following I describe memory at the neuroPhysiological level,
knowledge at the level of representation, and learning at the level of cognitive
function during information processing. Of course, inferences can be made
across levels, as must be the case in any comprehensive theory of cognition or
of second language learning. Problems arise, though, when explanations of
second language cognitive processes mix levels of description, claiming facts
obtained on tasks appropriate to one level of description necessarily indicate
facts about another level. Task appropriary is therefore a crucial determinant
of the validity of the claims that can be made about phenomena' The
implicit/explicit distinction refers to task conditions which manipulate degree
of awareness at the level of cognitive function. Whether cognitive functioning
under these task conditions reveals evidence of dissociations between
neurophysiological systems of memory, or of forms of knowledge
representation, is an inference in need of further suPPort from tasks
appropriate to the descriPtion and explanation of these particular levels'
Whether it is valid evidence of a difference in learning Processes depends on
our understanding of the role of control processes, involving the allocation of
attention, in information processing.
The Neurophysiological Level
Memory is a complex physiological system of neuronal tissue with cellular,
biophysical and molecular attributes (Squire & Zola-Morg an, -1991;
Thompson, 1986). Each of these attribute systems has mechanisms which
interact to determine memory trace circuits,i.e. the formation of synapses
between neurons, and which contribute to the plasticity of localized neural
networks, i.e. the capacity of the network to establish new or modify old
synapses (Robbins, 1992; Thompson, 1986). Various functional subsystems of
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memory have been proposed; between short-term, or working memory, and
long-term, or reference memory (Cowan 1988); between episodic 'personal'
memory, and semantic factual memory, and between declarative memory and
procedural memory (see McKoon, Ratcliffe & Dell, 1986; Snodgrass, L987;
Tulving, 1984). Some physiological evidence exists for separate stores
corresponding to memory for procedural skill and to long term memory for
dedarative information (see Cotman & Lynch, 1989; Paradis, 1993; Squire &
Zola-Morgan, 1991). Claims have been made that these memory systems are
differentially responsible for the storage of morpho-syntax (procedural
memory) and lexical items (declarative memory) in bilinguals (Paradis, 1993:
5), and possibly, therefore, with procedural versus declarative vocabulary
(Robinson, 1989,7992) during second language learning. Tasks may draw
differentially on one or the other system (Paradis, 7993), and this may be
evident in lexical performance on language learning tasks (Robinson,7993).
Evidence of functional dissociations on explicit and implicit measures of
memory is sometimes taken to confirm the episodic/ semantic distinction (see
Schacter, '1,987 and below). The contents of memory are the patterns of
activation formed over neurons (Alkon, 1988) that occur at various stages of
information processing. At the neurophysiological level knowledge is
isomorphic with these patterns of activation, and therefore with the contents
of memory.
The Representational Level
There are many theories of how these patterns of activation function as
representations of processed information (see Johnson & Hasher, 1987). I will
restrict myself to the issue of how knowledge of language might be
represented, and to distinguishing between two currently influential positions
which can be characterized as 'abstractionist' and 'distributive' (see
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Vokey & Brooks, 1992). The abstractionist
position claims that patterns of activation constitute a memorial
representation of patterns of invariance inherent in the exemplar set, because
'memory by its basic nature somehow abstracts the central tendency of a set of
disparate experiences, and gives relatively little weight to the specific
experiences that gave rise to these abstractions' (McClelland & Rumelhart,
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llrregular past tense mappings, claim Kim et al (1991), e.g. flylflew or stick/stuck, are
learned associatively and marked as such in the lexicon. Regular Past tense markings are
generated by rule, rather than learned associatively. Kim et al claim there is evidence for the
primacy of rule governed regular past tense morphology in the Preferred forms of denominal
1985: 159). Such abstract patterns of invariance have been termed schemata or
prototyPes, and work on concePt categorization (Posner & Keele' 1968' 1'970;
i.or"r,, iszsl has appeared to support this position (though see Anderson
1991). Knowledge of language, inihis view, is represented as a system of high
level generalizations or r;les' Such schematic representations may be
"*urglr,t and non-local, 
(Keil, 1989; Smith & Medin' 1981) or domain specific
and modular (Fodor, 1983) and shaped by innate' genetically determined
mechanisms at the neurobiological level. The X-bar schema, and the
principles and parameters described by Chomsky (1986)' which motivate the
,".oni lur,grr"le research described by White (1989)' are examPles of the
latter claim about the representation of our knowledge of language.
In contrast distributive positions claim Patterns of activation' or
representations are 'a conspirary of the entire ensemble of memory ffaces of
the individual experiences we have had with that unit' (Mclelland &
Rumelhart, 1985: 160), and stress the contribution of memory representations
foruniqueevents,orindividualinstances,toabstractknowledge'asinthe
'competition model' of language learning ProPosed by MacWhinney $987);
the 'multiPle trace theory' of memory storage and retrieval proposed by
Hintzman (1985); Nosofsky (1988) and Anderson's (1991) adaptive theories of
categorization, and Gasser's (1990) connectionist lexical memory model of
secondlanguagesentenceProduction.suchknowledgeisdistributedovelthe
entire contents of memory, which is viewed as a single interconnected
workspace.Incontrast,theabstractionistPositionassumesthatabstractrules
or schemata are stored in a sePalate semantic memoly. Pinker (1991) claims
that both rule-and-representation, abstlactionist theories, and associationist,
distributive theories are partly right and characterize different aspects of our
knowledge of our first language. For example, associationist theories are
needed to exPlain the acquisition of irregular Past tense morphology, since
such features are not reducible to formal statements or rules. HOwever, Sorne
rules, e.g. those for stating the conditions on regular Past tense morphology,
are necessary, and there is evidence of their productivity in preferred forms of
denominal verbsl (Kim, Pinker, Prince, Prasada, 1992; Lachter & Bever,
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1988). Iohnson & Hasher (1987: 540) acknowledge the possibility that mixed
representations may arise in a domain. This mixed representation position is
not to be confused with Krashen's (1985) position which is that our
knowledge of some aspects of a second language is doubly represented in an
acquired, and a learned system.2 Sasaki (1992) has recently objected to dual
knowledge formats of the type proposed by Krashen, on the grounds that
they make unreasonable storage and memory demands. Smolensky (1988)
stresses the compatibility of the two theories, and Schmidt (1990: 749)
suggests that second language learning under implicit not explicit conditions
(see below) may result in representations of the form proposed by
associationist, distributive theories.
The Level of Cognitive Function
Knowledge is functionally differentiated. For example, we have knowledge
that enables us to form concepts (Keil, 1989; Smith, 1989); to recognize
patterns (Neisser, '1967); to perform skilled activity (Anderson, 1983;
Salthouse, 1986; Wicken, 1.989); to recall events in which we participated
(Tulving, 1985), and to infer facts about events in which we did not
(Pellegrino, 1985), as well as to communicate through a first and second
language. Leaming is the process by which such knowledge is gained. It may
involve an innate, prespecified component at the neurophysiological level
verbs in English. Because nouns, unlike verbs, are never marked for irregular morphology,
which is learned associatively, 'verbs with noun roots 
-denominal verbs- are regular even if
they are phonologically identical to irregular verbs, hence; flied out,/*flew out to center field;
high-sticked/*high-stuck the goalie' (799'l: 173).
2Krashen claims that what can be informally and unconsciously acquired exceeds what can
be formally and consciously leamed. One reason is that linguists (and language teachers who
derive their descriptive apparatus and notation from linguists) 'readily admit that they can
dexribe only fragments of natural language'(1981: 114). Further, only 'easy' rules are
learnable, for example those for pluralizing NPs, the third person singular morpheme for
regular present tense verbs, and regular and irregular past tense morphemes (1981: 11tl-115).
More complex rules can only be acquired. Consequently, while about 57o of the possible rules
of a language can be doubly represented in an acquired and a leamed system, the remaining
9570, consisting of, as yet, unformalized rules, or difficult rules, can only be acquired ( see
Krashen 1976: see also l,arsen-Freeman & Long 1991: 240 for further discussion of Krashen's
position on this matter and Bialystok 7979 and Green & Hecht 1991 for further discussion of
the easy hard rule distinction).
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(Chomsky, 1986). Knowledge may subsequently be added through ' an
endogenous process of internal representational change ' (Karmiloff-smith,
1g90:59), or through restructuring as a consequence of interaction with the
environment (carey, 1988; Mclaughlin, 1990b). In cognitive learning theory,
(as opposed to behaviorist learning theory which views learning as the
accumulation of simple stimulus-response reflexes, see Houston, 1976;
Narendra & Thathachar, 1989; Roitblat, 1987) this is assumed to be regulated
and constrained by the allocation of limited attentional resources to Process
the information needed to accomplish learning tasks' In this approach
information processing is under executive control, and control Processes
operate to regulate the allocation of attention needed for encoding and
retrieval of information in memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Cowan, 1988).
Memory is the affected capacity, and control Processes are the causal capacity:
interaction between the two is assumed to be necessary for the acquisition and
retention of knowledge. However, as Cowan (1988) notes, research in
cognitive psychology has not yet settled on a view of attentional resource
allocation consistent with the properties of memory. Specifications of the
interaction between them at the level of cognitive function is therefore
necessarily speculative, though essential to the elaboration of theoretical
models of the processes involved in converting input to intake (chaudron,
1985; Ellis, 1993a; Sharwood-Smith, 1991).
Attentional Control, Automaticity and Learning
Schmidt (Jr990, 7992) has distinguished between uses of the term
'consciousness' that refer to knowledge, intention and awareness, and the
extent to which such distinctions can be invoked to explain asPects of second
language development. I will concentrate here on his distinction between the
levels of awareness involved in perception, noticing and understanding, and
their role in learning. Figure 1 (Appendix 1) is a model of the attentional
control system suitable for describing the processing of information during
grammaticality judgements tasks, on sentence stimuli, as in the transfer tasks
of implicit learning experiments3 (Reber, 1989). Paths taken by information
3In this research implicit learning is defined as the Process whereby imPlicit knowledge is
acquired and is the basis for valid inferences about its representation. It is true that some
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about input are represented by solid arrows; comrnunication and conhol links
among rnechanisms and actions are represented by dotted arrows. Input is
consciously perceived on entry to the comparison mechanism which
compares the representation of the attended input with representations stored
in memory (A1). Matches with stored representations, and consultation with
other rule-like representations or schemata via mechanisms of e.g.,
association, generalization, differentiation, hypothesis-testing, bring
additional information about the input into awareness which provides input
to the executive decision mechanism (A2). At this level noticing, the result of
the allocation of focal attention, occurs. This mechanism then selects from an
array of possible actions. Initially the input may be noticed but not
understood , resulting in executive decisions to make further comparisons
(A3), and to reattend to the dimensional analysis of the input (A4). This is the
process whereby understanding is achieved, or not. Practice, in attention
based theories (Mclaughlin, 1987; Mclaughlin, Mcleod & Ross, 1983; Shiffrin
& Schneider, 1977) results in faster and more determinate information from
the executive decision mechanism, leading to faster, more automatic decisions
by reducing the need for attentional effort along A3 & 4. Logan (1988, 1990)
has proposed that this process only characterizes the controlled phase of
processing. Automaticity is the result of accumulated memories for specific
instances, which after reaching a certain threshold of activation become a
more efficient means of decision making and the executive mechanism (81)
subsequently responds on that basis alone. Evidence for this is taken to be the
claim implicit knowledge preexists the leaming process, as is argued in the case of language,
for example, by Chomsky (1986) and others who maintain that genetically determined
configurations of possible languages interact with, and so preempt in some way, contact with
the data of experience. If such knowledge remains available to second language learning
adults it could also be claimed to be a form of implicit knowledge that preexists the learning
process. However, the question of its availability in second language learning remains a
matter of dispute (see Bley-Vroman 1989; Chaudron & Bley-Vroman 1990), as does the need
to posit such a construct in order to explain first language development (Bohannon 1988).
While the two senses of implicit knowledge distinguished here, knowledge which is innately
prespecified and knowledge which is the result of implicit leaming are not incompatible, it is
the extent of the role of the latter that Reber is concerned to investigate: 'lmplicit acquisition
of complex knowledge is taken as a foundation process for the development of absEact , tacit
knowledge of all kinds. The stepping off place is that there it at this iuncture, no reason to
place any priority on particular biological determinants of a specific kind. All forms of
implicit knowledge are taken as essentially similar at their deepest levels.' (1989: 219).
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fact that response time to instances of a problem decreases as a function of the
number of presentation times, and is significantly faster than response times
to novel instances of the same problem, while accuracy remains the same for
novel and repeated instances. Two forms of learning are claimed to occur on
these tasks, learning in the controlled phase of the task, during which rules
are consulted, and awareness is at the level of understanding, and instance
learning which becomes the basis of responses later in the task, where
awareness remains at the level of noticing. Both are equally effective on these
tasks, though instance learning is unsuited to more complex task conditions,
Logan claims (1988: 518). They differ only in their demands on attentional and
memory resources (see Robinson &Ha,7993), and resemble forms of learning
induced by implicit and explicit task conditions.
Implicit and Explicit Task Conditions
Performance under implicit and explicit conditions has been assessed on tasks
requiring memory for previously presented material (see Paradis, 1993;
Roediger, Weldon & Challis, 1989; Schacter, 7987,7989) and on learning tasks
requiring acceptability judgements of strings generated by artificial grammars
(see Reber, 1.989,1.992; Reber & Allen, 1978). Dissociations in the performance
of normal, elderly and abnormal populations (amnesics, psychotics,
dyslexics, aphasics) have been observed, demonstrating the robustness and
superiority of implicit learning and memory, in contrast to learning and
memory under explicit conditions. Automatic processes too, claims Reber
(7992: 6) are examples of implicit systems, (though see Mclaughlin,Rossman
& Mcleod 1983: 143 who identify irnplicit learning as a controlled process)
and like implicit memory and learning they operate independently of factors
affecting reflective and conscious processing. The consciousness dominated
forms of cognition, Reber claims, are ontogenetically and phylogenetically
later evolved than their unconscious counterparts, and completely dissociated
from them4 (Reber, 1992).
4Reber's explanation of implicit learning is not one which draws heavily on other work in
cognitive psychology. Rather than achieve explanation by integrating evidence from
dissociations with cognitive frameworks established to explain other phenomena, a
procedure which he claims 'will not work' (1992: 10), Reber maintains, 'the classic
functionalist stance...(that)... the deep dissociation between implicit and explicit needs to be
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Recently second language researchers have studied the effects of
learning under the two conditions on second language learners' ability to
identify well formed examples of stimuli generated by artificial (Nation &
Mclaughlin, 1986), semi-artificial (Hulstijn, 19gg,79gO) and natural language
grammars (Doughty, 1991; N.Ellis, 1993). To date there have been no studies
that examine the memory performance of second language learners under
implicit and explicit task conditions, though the distinction holds promise for
those researchers concerned to motivate and refine existing measures of
memory employed in aptitude batteries (Skehan, 19g9; Stansfield, 1990).
Memory research and research on learning in cognitive psychology
have operationalized the distinction between explicit and implicit task
conditions differently. In memory experiments, performance on direct
measures of memory, which require conscious cued recall and recognition of
previously presented stimuli, has been contrasted with performance on
indirect measures of recall and recognition, for example word fragment or
word-stem completion tasks (Merikle & Reingold, 1991; Richardson-Klavehn
& Blor( 1988; Schacter, 1982). The latter do not overtly instruct the learner to
access the previously presented material. Debate continues over the question
of whether differential performance on these tasks (Light & Singh, 19g7;
Russo & Parkiry 1993) is an artifact of the similarity of processing demands
made at study and at test (Roediger, Weldon & Challis, 19g9), or is a
consequence of access to different memory systems (paradis, 1993; Schacter
1989; Tulving, 1984, 1985,7986), a claim which must be acknowledged as an
viewed from the context of the adaptive value that such a division has for the organisms that
possess it and from the evolutionary advantages that would accrue to any species that
exploited it' (1992: 10). Reber is explicit about the fact that he has no '" theory' of the cognitive
unconscious in the standard sense', or what he calls a 'formalization of a set of principles that
can provide a representation of the existing data', stating that'I do not believe we are
anywhere near ready for such an undertaking' (1992:'12). Reber's work, then, is primarily of
descriptive importance for second language researchers, and contrasts with the heavily
thmry laden approach to describing innate constraints, and therefore implicit knowledge
familiar from the Chomskyan paradigm (1986; White 1989). However, for such descriptive
information to be of value to second language acquisition theory construction it must be
integrated within a model of the relations between the levels of cognition I have described
above, This will require less caution than Reber typically displays in intetrating the data
with explanations of the interaction between memory and attention at the level of cognitive
function developed for other purposes (e.g., Logan 1988; Shiffrin & Schneider 1972 Hinzman
1985; Schacter 1989; Nosofsky 1992).
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inference across levels of description.
The implicit/explicit distinction has been operationalized in studies of
learning by contrasting performance under conditions requiring a conscious
search for rules, with those in which instruction is given simply to memorize
presented examples. The examples are strings generated by a finite state
grammars (Reber, '1967, '1989; Reber & Allen, 1978; McAndrews &
Moscovitch, 1985; Vokey & Brooks, 1992) which is assumed to represent a
stimulus domain of a sufficient level of complexity that it could not be
consciously learned in its entirety in the time available for the task. The
contrast is made between relative speed and accuracy of performance of
subjects from both groups on a transfer acceptability judgement test. Subjects
trained under implicit conditions typically outperform those trained under
explicit conditions, though the explicit condition is equally effective if the
rules to be learned are simple and the structure of the stimulus domain is
made salient (see Schmidt, 1993 for a summary). The extent of conscious
5In the followint grammar strings of symbols are generated in a left-to right,
non-hierarchical fashion by following a path of arrows from the initial state 1 to the terminal
state 5 (e.9. T tS] X S). Such a grammar was chosen, comments Reber (1989:220), in part
because it can generate a large number of strings to use as stimuli, and because it is
'sufficiently complex ...that the underlying formal structure is not within the conscious
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awareness is assessed via measures of the degree to which subjects can
verbalize their knowledge of the rules underlying the stimulus domain.
Debate continues over whether the representation resulting from
exposure during the implicit condition is abstract, as Reber clairns, or the
result of piecemeal fragmentary knowledge of bigram pairings (Perruchet &
Pacteau, 1990), chunks (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990), or influenced by
item specific knowledge ffokey & Brooks, 1992). Evidence of item specific
effects, however, need not contradict the position that the implicit knowledge
base is abstract if one adheres to a distributive view of representation which
claims memory for specific items is distributed across the entire
representation, and that schemata or higher level generalizations are not
stored separately, but are emergent on encoding (McClelland & Rumelhart,
1985), or are instantiated on retrieval (Hinzman, 1985).
The extent to which learners are unconscious of knowledge resulting
from learning under implicit conditions is also debated (Brody, 1989; Dulany,
Carlson & Dewey, 1984). In particular, Brody (1989) claims that subjects are
not always able to verbalize their conscious knowledge of rules when asked to
do so directly by an interviewer following the learning tasks, and as Mathews
et al. (1989) have shown, altering the nature of this task by asking subjects to
verbally instruct a second party on how to complete the learning tasks reveals
subjects to be more consciously aware of rules than the verbalization
procedure Reber adopts.
In summary, the implicit/explicit distinction refers to task conditions
which manipulate degree of awareness at the level of cognitive function.
Performance on such tasks can be the basis for inferring details of cognitive
organization at the levels of representation and of neurophysiology. Claims
that dissociations between performance on direct and indirect memory tasks
are evidence for the operation of separate systems are thus inferences relating
the level of cognitive function to the neurophysiological level of memory.
With regard to learning, any objection to the claim about the abstractness of
the knowledge based established during learning is an argument about
preferences at the representational level. This is separable from criticisms of
the assumed degree of awareness of rules, which is appropriate to the level of
cognitive function, and addresses the nature of the information processing on
the tasks.
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In the following section I discuss the extent to which knowledge
consfructs, inferred from empirical evidence of performance under irnplicit
and explicit task conditions, can be validly compared. I illustrate this by first
specifying the relationship of task conditions to inferences at the levels of
cognitive function, representation and neurophysiology in some currently
influential theories of skill acquisition, automaticity and second language
learning, and then examining the extent to which the levels of representation
in these models can be compared.
IMPLICIT/EXPLICIT LEARNINC, MEMORYAND KNOWLEDGE IN SLA
THEORY CONSTRUCTION
Discussions of these distinctions in second Ianguage research have tended to
focus on the issue of explicit versus implicit knowledge, and the domain of
such knowledge has invariably been grammar rather than , for example,
strategic, pragmatic or sociolinguistic information (Bialystok, -1979, 1982,1990;
Ellis, 1993a; Green & Hecht, 1991; Krashen,7979,1985; Sharwood Smith, 1981,
1991; Bialystok & Sharwood Smith, 1985). There is some discussion, at present
increasing, of implicit versus explicit learning (N. Ellis 1993; Hulstijn,
-1989,7990; Nation & Mclaughlin, 1986; Mclaughlin, Rossman & Mcleod,
1983; Schmidt, 7990, 1992a, 1993) , though little discussion of implicit versus
explicit memory (Paradis, 1993; Schmidt, 1990,1.992a).
Often these distinctions are made in the course of elaborating
theoretical models of second language learning (e.g., Bialystok,1982; Ellis,
1993a; Krashen, 1985; Sharwood-Smith, 1.98L,1.991. ). In such cases the uses of
the terms 'implicit' and 'explicit' are not used to refer to experimentally
manipulated task conditions at the level of cognitive function, which can
become the basis of inferences about organization at the representational and
neurophysiological levels. Rather, they are independently invoked to describe
distinctions at particular levels. Thus the common basis of the distinction in a
specified set of task conditions is lost, and it is unclear how one use of the
term, for example 'implicit knowledge', relates to another, or how they relate
to consftucts like 'implicit learning', which should be the basis on which they
are inferred. These are critical problems for theory construction in SLA.
Essentially, the vertical dimension of theory construction, which indicates the
relationship between the operational construct implicit/explicit (at the level of
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cognitive function and task condition) to inferences about the 
representational
and neurophysiological f"""i" """at to be specified' 
otherwise meaningful
horizontal comparisons between the uses of these terms 
at separate levels
cannot be made. This is 
'"'"iy ift" case 
with the theoretical uses of the terms in
the work of those ,e'"utth"t' I have identified above' More 
experimentally
grounded work, like that of Hulstiin (1990) and N Ellis 
(1993) avoids' to an
extent, these Problems'
Construct Comparison in SLA Theory Construction
The development of a theory of second language acquisition' 
on which to base
recommendations for sylius design' will necessarily involve reference 
to
research findings and theoretical constructs from other' related' 
areas of
inquiry, like psychology and linguistics' Theories may differ 
not only in
source, but in scope (Long, 1993), with some attemPting to integrate 
findings
from a broad range of aomains' The relative importance of the 
contributions
of constitutive domains may result in indirect rivalry' not direct opposition
(Berretta, 1991). Theorie' #y ubo differ in their choice of format (Crookes'
1992). Caremust be taken, of course' in constructing a theory on the basis 
of
interdisciplinary findings' In particular' theorists must guard against
identifying seemingly similar constructs' arising in different domains' as
identical, in order to maintain a needed distinction in theories and against
illegitimatety comparing two constructs which do not' for a variety of reasons'
stra"re ar,ytt lng oih", than a notional similarity' Such is the case in Ellis's
(1993a) attempts (discussed below) to construct a theoretical argument for the
role of structural units of analysis in second language syllabus design on the
basis, in part, of distinctions between types of knowledge; procedural versus
declarative (Anderson, 1983), implicit versus explicit (Reber, 1989)' automatic
versus controlled (Mclaughlin, 1987).
I have argued that claims about the lepresentational level, and claims
for a valid distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge can only
clearly be made in relation to a fully specified model of relations between the
level of cognitive function, (and a theory of how manipulations in task
conditions affect this) and the levels of rePresentation and neurophysiology
(see Figure 2, Appendix 2). It is only possible to make valid comparisons
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between knowledge constructs at the representational level in fully specified
models- partially specified models, which do not specify the task conditions
that give rise to the differential forms of representation, do not admit direct
comparison (see Figure 4, Appendix 2).
Fully and Partially Specified Models
Fully specified models of vertical relations between the task condition, and
the levels of cognitive function, representation and neurophysiology are given
in Appendix 2. Figure 2 shows vertical relations for implicit learning tasks,
where specified task conditions allow inferences to be made about the level of
cognitive function, (learning) and the levels of representation (knowledge)
and neurophysiology (memory). Figure 3 shows the vertical relations between
inferences and levels for the implicit memory tasks discussed previously, and
Figure 4 shows how, for example, anatomical evidence frorn magnetic
resonance imaging (Squire & Zola-Morgan,1997) would affect the nature of
the relations between levels and allowable inferences. Figure 5 shows the
relationship between two partially specified models. In these cases, task
conditions are not specified (e.g., as in Krashen, 1985; see Figure 8 and
discussion below) or are, of their nature incomparable, (e.g., as between
Anderson, 1983, whose model was developed for the purposes of machine
implementation and Reber, 1989, who has studied human learning under the
specified task conditions: see Figures 6 & 7 and discussion below) and the
description of the level of cognitive function is not derived by inference from
empirical evidence of changes that occur as a consequence of manipulating
the task conditions. The inferences about representation based on such
hypothetical constructs, while they may bare notional similarity, cannot be
equated, or each reduced to the other. Contrast this situation with the
comparisons between inferences at the representational level that result from
comparing fully specified models- as in the case of comparing implicit
learning experiments that differ only slightly in their specifications of task
conditions. As yet, evidence from implicit learning studies suggests that such
slight alterations in task conditions can affect the Ievel of cognitive function
(Curran & Keele, 1993; Hartman, Knopman & Nissen, 1989; Mathews et al.,
1989; Vokey & Brooks, 1,992), and one would necessarily want to be able to
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compare the inferences about representation based
function under these similar conditions.
Horizontal Comparisons of Forms of Knowledge
on evidence of cognitive
Discussion of distinctions between forms of knowledge have been a consistent
feature of second language acquisition theory since the early theoretical work
of Corder (7967), and Selinker (1972) which established the study of
interlanguage as an area of inquiry involving both knowledge of the target
language, the first language and the internalry evolving, cognitivery regurated
'approximative system' (Nemser, 7971,) of the learner. The Chomskyan
distinction which predates this era, between knowredge and performance(1959) , is still current, in the form of i-knowledge and e_knowledge(Chomsky, 1985), and various models of information processing have
contributed to the pool of ava able distinctions between types of knowredge
from which second language theory has drawn. Ellis (1993a) is just one
example of a researcher who has made use of these distinctions; others
include Ferch & Kasper (1983), sharwood-smith (1981), Bialystok (1982) and
Tarone (1988). However, the current theoretical position is not a happy one in
this respect, since comparisons abound between forms of knowledge
identified as a consequence of one line of research, and one set of task
conditions, and others set up and specified quite differently. The intention in
referring to these distinctions has often been to support a distinction between
two superordinate categories of knowledge which are differentially
responsive to conscious introspection, and which are presumed to regulate
language development in different ways. One such distinction is that of
Krashen's (1985) between the knowledge base that is consequent upon
'acquisition', and that consequent upon 'learning' (1931, 19g5). As a
clarification of currently influential distinctions between forms of knowledge
Appendix 3 (Figures 6-1.0) illustrates models of vertical relations appropriate
to the work of Anderson (1983), Reber (1989), Krashen (1985), Logan (1988),
Shiffrin & Schneider (7977), and Mclaughlin (1987).
Anderson: Anderson's ACT theory (1983) (Figure 6) was developed to model
expert-novice transitions in skilled behaviour using a machine implementable
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production systems approach to knowledge cornpilation and retrieval. There
are four stages in the model; i) inputs are stored in declarative memory; ii)
general problern solving productions interpret declarative facts; iii)
productions suited to specific tasks are entered into procedural memory,
which are eventually iv) fine tuned to a specific class of problems (Greene,
1987; Schmidt, 1992b). Although Anderson speculates about the adequacy of
this model in accounting for human learning it was developed to be ,r,".hir,"
implementable. It was not tested empirically using hurnan subjects who
performed under specified task conditions. To this extent it remains a theory
at the level of cognitive function which assumes, rather than infers, two
different knowledge bases, declarative and procedural knowledge, which
interact during the transition from novice to expert behaviour and which are
themselves asserted to relate to different memory systems.
Reber: It is not possible, therefore, to validly compare the inferences about
knowledge representation in Anderson's partially specified model with those
made by Reber (Figure Z) regarding the results of implicit learning
experiments, where task conditions are specified, and evidence of
performance under these conditions is adduced to support the distinctions
made between forms of knowledge at the representational level. In addition,
Anderson's hypothetical model explains a transition from one task condition
to another, novice to expert. Reber's studies (e.g., Reber, 19Z6) compare
differential performance on tasks specified as +/* conscious search for rules;
+/- intention to learn, and such conditions are experimentally replicable (e.g.,
the conditions specified in Reber, 7976, are replicated by Reber & Allen, 197g;
McAndrews & Moscovitch, 1985; Vokey & Brooks, 7992).ln Reber,s model,
two knowledge systems are inferred to be differentially responsible for
performance under the specified conditions; a complex, abstract, and fully
developed implicit representation, and a simpler, imperfectly developed
representation. Reber, unlike Anderson, makes no statements about the
relationships of knowledge at the representational level to memory systems.
Krashen: In contrast to Reber, Krashen's model (Figure 8) is partially
specified, and necessarily so, since the task conditions which Krashen asserts
must be met for 'acquisition', or 'learning' to occur are impossible to
manipulate experimentally. The main problem is that Krashen claims the
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'affective filter' must be lowered in the acquisition condition; ' The affective
filter is a mental block that prevents acquires from fully utilizing the
comprehensible input they receive for language acquisition. When it is 'up'
the acquirer may understand what he hears and reads, but the input will not
reach the LAD. This occurs when the acquirer is unmotivated, lacking in self
confidence or anxious'(1985: 3). While it is possible to manipulate variables
like intention, or attention through task instructions, it difficult to ethically,
and within an experimental setting, manipulate anxiety and other
components of the 'affect' construct, even if the subtle differences Krashen
assumes are causal i.e. between 'low' and 'moderate' anxiety (1985: 25) could
be quantified.6 Krashen asserts that differences in representation arise as a
consequence of functioning under these ideal conditions, i.e. acquired
knowledge and learned knowledge, which, unlike Anderson's model, are
non-interfaced. Krashen also makes no claims about the relationship of
knowledge to memory, although his position (seemingly adopted by Paradis
(1983) who does make the claim) would appear to imply a distinct systems
approach, as in Anderson's model.
Logan: Like Reber, and unlike Anderson and Krashen, Logan fully specifies
his model (Figure 9). There are clear, and operationalizable specifications of
task conditions relating to the distinctions +/- practice; +/- early; +/-
attentional eUort +/- consistency of environment. However, like Anderson,
and unlike Reber, Logan's tasks, since they are intended to examine the extent
of the development of skilled behaviour within the individual, involve a
transition from one task to the other. Like Reber, Anderson and Krashen,
Logan associates the task conditions with two distinct forms of knowledge at
the representational level- an abstract rule based representation, and an
instance based representation of specific examples encountered during the
tasks.
6It is t..r" that there are constructs for measuring anxiety, for example the Taylor Manifest
Aniety Scale (see Krashen (1991: 30)), but although Krashen reports that anxiety, as measured
by this scale, was positively correlated with achievement in Spanish as a second language ( in a
study by Chastain (1925)), no particular point on the scale is identified by him as distinguishing
low from moderate anxiety. Also, as Larsen-Freeman & Long (1991: 243) Point out, it isn't clear
to what extent other factors supposedly regulating the lowering and raising of the affective
filter, i.e. high motivation and high esteem, can offset the problem of high anxiety, and vice
versa.
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shiffrin & schneider, and Mclaughlin: shiffrin and schneider's model of the
development of automaticity (Figure 10), was adopted by Mclaughlin as an
explanation for the developrnent of skilled behaviour in second language
learners, (Mclaughlin, 1987, 1990; Mclaughlin, Rossman & Mcleod, 1983)' It
differs from Logan's in not inferring two knowledge sources at the
representational level. Automaticity is assumed to develop as a consequence
oispeed up of rule based representations. (The contrast between their model
ofthedevelopmentofautomaticityandLogan.siscaPturedinFigurel,
Appendix 1.)
ln summary, it can be seen that, despite making apparently similar claims
for distinctions between forms of knowledge at the rePresentational level, the
various models differ from each other either in failing to specify
operationalizable task conditions (e.g., Krashen v' Reber), or in specifying
conditions for transitions between tasks, rather than for performance on
separate tasks (e.g., Logan v. Reber), or in terms of the inferences made about
the forms of knowledge at the representational level (shiffrin & schneider v.
Loga). While the distinctions between forms of knowledge in these models may
bare a notionat sirnilarity to each other, they are not identical, or instances of
superordinate umbrella categories.
THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR SECOND LANGUAGE SYLLABUS
DESIGN
Ellis (1993a) attempts to make a case for the role of a structural syllabus as a
means to promote 'gradual mastery' of implicit second language knowledge
and his is a recent case of the use of the distinctions considered above in the
domain of second language acquisition theory. Like Bialystok (1982) Ellis
proposes a two dimensional model of skill learning. In Bialystok's terms these
are the dimensions of analysis and control. Ellis replaces her +/- analyzed
distinction with a distinction between two tyPes of knowledge, explicit and
implicit. Here is an immediate problem. For Bialystok, this dimension
represents a continuum of analysis, with early language being towards the
unanalyzed end of the scale, and analyzed language characterizing the later,
more developed system (for the debate about whether learning must begin
with analyzed or unanalyzed knowledge see Bialystok, 1990; Hulstijn, 1990b).
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ForEllisthisisadichotomybetweeninterfaced,butdistinctimplicitand
explicit 'types' of knowledge. Bialystok's dimension of control is termed the
aectarutive to procedural dimension by Ellis, importing 4ndg1gg1'g (1983)
distinction.LanguagedevelopmentischaractelizedastheProcesswhereby
explicit declarative knowledge becomes impiicit procedural knowledge. Ellis
aiopts a 'weak interface' position, which allows some seePage of explicit
kr,oil"dge into implicit knowledge, but rejects the ,strong interface' position,
which clJms all explicit declarative knowledge can be directly converted into
implicit procedurai knowledge through practice' The role of the structural
syliabus is to identify items which are candidates for the transition, and the
roleofmethodologyistoensurethatlearnersexplicitlynoticethem,ornotice
the gap between their current rePresentations and these features' This is
necessary for the conversion of explicit into implicit knowledge'
There are problems with Ellis's position which stem largely from his
basic assertion that an agreed upon distinction between explicit and implicit
knowledge exists and is 'common in cognitive psychology ' ('1993a:93)' a
claim he attributes to Bialystok (1982). It is true, as I have shown' that a
number of distinctions are made between forms of representation in the
models I have discussed, but these are not all inferences derived from
performanceontasksunderspecified,andcomparableimplicitandexplicit
conditions. There are model-specific differences between these distinctions,
as I have pointed out, yet Ellis ignores this' Ellis, to this extent, aPPears to
conflate similar notions in order to maintain a supposedly needed
superordinate distinction. However, his failure to justify the empirical basis of
his distinction leaves him open to charges that the claims based on it are
purely speculative and misrepresentative of current thinking'
It is true, as Ellis claims, that implicit and explicit knowledge need to
be distinguished from procedural and declarative knowledge, and I gave
some reasons for distinguishing Reber's model from Anderson's above (see
Figures 6 and 7). However, Ellis, while rejecting the strong interface position
that practice alone is sufficient for the conversion of explicit to implicit
knowledge, does allow 'opportunities for formally practicing the new
knowledge' (1993a: 95) a role in this process. The extent of the role of practice
is problematic. The suggestion that practice is,, to some degree, a condition for
the process of converting explicit into imPlicit knowledge involves
identifying, for example, the level of knowledge rePresentation in Reber's
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model, which distinguishes implicit from explicit knowledge (Figure 7) with
that in Logan's (Figure 9) or Shiffrin & Schneider's (Figure 10)' which relates
two knowledge bases to each other via practice' and I have given reasons why
this is not a valid comParison.
Practice, in EIIis's model, in fact has two senses' which are not fully
articulated or differentiated. In one sense practice is a methodologically
facilitated psycholinguistic operation responsible for effecting the transition
from declarative to Procedurulized 
'ep'esentations' 
in the manner described
by Anderson (1983) along the control dimension of his model' If practice'
though,inthissenseisnotnecessaryfortheconversionofexplicittoimplicit
knoriledge along the knowledge dimension then a single attention drawing
activity ,lr.o.rtd ue enough to activate reorganizational links between explicit
and implicit knowledge. This, it would seem, is the second sense of practice
imptei by Ellis's model, and relates to the explicit to implicit transition -
*"ihodotogi.ally facilitated,consciousness-raising' activities which
encourage 'juided self-discovery' of explicitly presented forms by the learner(see Sharwood-Smith 1981). It is not clear, though' what
consciousness-raising involves, or why it would facilitate the integration of
explicitknowledgeintoimplicitknowledge,ratherthanthereverseprocess.
what is needed in Ellis's account is a specification of the level of attention
necessary to consciousness-raising, and how it might be manipulated, and
discussion of whether the focussing of attention is, in some cases/ the
cumulative result of practice on consciousness-raising activities rather than
the result of one-shot exposure to a form. Crucial to the consciousness-raising
function of practice, I suggest, are the duration of the initial activation of a
representation, and its degree of similarity to Previously activated
representationsT, since these two factors have been shown to determine the
Tclass & Holyoak (7986:273), discussing the attentional demands of concept leaming (see
also Hintzman 1974), claim thaL for a concePt to be learned on a single trial, following a single
exposure to an input, the input must be sufficiently activated during encoding. The duration of
the initial activation, and the similarity of the representation to previously processed
representations will together determine the allocation of attention to the inPut. when the
degree of similarity of a previously pres€nted example to an immediately succeeding example
is great there may be proactive inhibition, or a reduction in the attention allocated the rePeated
input. Repetitions of an input, or similar inputs, are more attention demanding, and therefore
lead to greater levels of activation and learning when distributed over periods of time, than
when massed or successive repetitions are processed ( johnston & Uhl 1976).
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extent of attention devoted to a stimulus (see Glass & Holyoak, 1.9g6: 273).
Experimental manipulation of these variables with regard to the input
presented to learners, and the extent to which the targeted features of the
input are 'noticed' (schmidt, 1990) may help clarify the, at present ill-defined,
'consciousness-raising' construct which Ellis invokes.
Elsewhere Ellis (1993b: 6) has identified the role of practice in
developing proceduralization as being one which encourages learner
production of the target language. consciousness-raising practice activities,
which develop awareness of the form of input, on the other hand, encourage
understanding but do not require the production of sentences manifesting
the structures that are the focus of instruction. It is not clear, though, why
production exercises cannot be used to develop awareness of the form of
input oral pattern practice using substitution tables focussed on past tense
morphemes, for example, would seem to be one way to do this. Neither is it
clear why consciousness raising activities should be developed which avoid
the requirement that learners produce a structure, as, in principal, they must
if the two senses of practice are not to be conflated8. It is unclear, too, how
to justify the assertion that implicit knowledge consists of formulaic and
rule-based knowledge (7993a:93). How does this relate to Logan's distinction
between the knowledge base drawn on in automatic behaviour, (memory for
instances), and that drawn on in controlled behaviour, (rule-based
representations), which seems to distinguish the two? Krashen (19g1: g3-99) is
dear about his position that formulaic knowledge can play no role in the
development of the acquired system and the differentiation of its knowledge
base. Prefabricated routines, or 'memorized whole utterances', Krashen claims
'are essentially and fundamentally different from creative language'(l981: 99).
Reber also maintains that the knowledge base established under implicit
learning conditions is 'abstract, and not dependent in any important way on
the particular physical manifestations of the stimuli' (1989:225).
The notion of the interface between implicit and explicit knowledge,
8At worst, the types of exercises that most clearly exemplify the two forms of practice Ellis
distinguishes are choral drilling of exemplar patterns, and individual, discrete point grammar
activities. Both of these are far from being communicative, group-work 'activities which will
supply learners with comprehensible input and (which) therefore will enable them to acquire
new linguistic features'(1993b: 8). However, it is motivating the use and design of such activities
that Ellis cites as one of the main contributions of SLA research to second language pedagogy.
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however, is the most problematic aspect of Ellis's model. None of the models I
have described , aPart from Anderson's, allow for interaction between two
knowledge bases- they are simply consequences of cognitive function under
different task conditions. one of the models Ellis cites to illusftate the strong
interface position, which he rejects, that, 'explicit knowledge can change into
implicit knowledge as a result of practice' 0993a: 95), that of Mclaughlin'
does not distinguish beffeen two forms of knowledge at the representational
level (see schm idt,'1992b 107 for discussion). Precisely what evidence is there
for the claim, fundamental to the proposals Ellis makes, that explicit
knowledge 'feeds into' (1993: 98) implicit knowledge, a term borrowed from
Bialystok (1979) (who is guilty o{ similar obscurity in this matter; for
discussion, see odlin, 1986)? There is certainly no precedent for this in the
work of Reber (1989), and although Mathews et al. (1989) have suggested that'
under certain task conditions, and learning certain types of grammars, a
mutually beneficial sequential relation between implicit and explicit modes of
learning can be inferred this does not mean that the knowledge bases of these
separate activities are interfaced. Ellis asserts, without ever explaining in
terms of his constructs, that developmental data is evidence for the fact that
explicit knowledge, at particular developmentally sensitive points, can trigger
restructuring, or stagewise leaps in the complexity of the learners' implicit
systems.
This is, in fact, the essence of Ellis's argument in favour of a role for the
structural syllabus in pedagogy - there is develoPment or restructuring which
may be triggered by explicit instruction or focus on forms' As such his
proposals need not invoke a distinction between implicit and explicit
knowledge, which, I have argued, in the form Ellis presents it, is insufficiently
motivated by empirical research into the nature of implicit and explicit
processes.There are problems with this reduced Position, as Ellis
acknowledges, and I will briefly mention four. Sequencing a syllabus by
structure implies assumptions about the order of learning, but i) we have
insufficient developmental evidence to motivate decisions about all possible
structures, ii) some structures may not be developmentally constrained, but
variational (Pienemann, 1989), iii) there are variations in rate of Progress
through those developmental sequences that are assumed to be known, so
groups of students cannot be treated homogeneously over time and iv) the
precise point of learner development is difficult to identify from production
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data since there is trailing, or recapitulation of developmental stages prior to
the current one, and scouting, or initial excursions into a new developmental
stage before the wholesale shift is made (Larsen-Freeman & Long, 1991).9
CONCLUSION
There is thus a danger of assuming the compatibility of the various definitions
of knowledge I have considered without sufficiently addressing their
differences. The working definitions of knowledge constructs needed for the
purposes of second language theory construction should, I suggest, be clearly
related to, and motivated by, empirical work in cognitive psychology and
experimental second language research. If this is not done, the theory of
second language learning based on such distinctions will be incoherent, and
the resulting pedagogic proposals unclear, and I have argued that in Ellis's
case this is so. Some reason therefore exists, I would argue, for definitional
culling (see Long 1993; Berretta 1991) and for specifying the particular
definition of implicit' knowledge one assumes if coherent theories, and clear
proposals for pedagogy are to be based on the construct. My preference is for
definitions based on fully specified models of the relationship of task
conditions, (which may be labelled implicit and explicit, or direct and
indirect) to inferences about knowledge at the representational level (see
Appendix 2). Elsewhere I have proposed that implicit and explicit learning
are 'fundamentally similar' processes in the adult, and close examination of
the implicit learning and memory studies that have been done in cognitive
psychology does not support the claim that different processing demands of
implicit and explicit learning tasks result in distinct knowledge bases, or are
supported by distinct memory systems (Robinson 1994). However, such
conclusions are based largely on evidence of artificial grammar learning
experiments (e.g. Reber 1989.; Mattews et al 1989) and there is a clear need for
more second language studies which examine the acquisition of natural
language under different experimental conditions, (e.g., Doughty, "1991;
9Given these considerations decisions about sequencing of structures are impossible to
resolve. As Ellis admits, a linear syllabus in which structural items are presented one by one,
according to some notion of learnability, is inadequate, particularly given point iii) above. A
spiral syllabus, in which items are recycled more than once'is still a hit-{r-miss affair'(1993:
103), since it is impossible to motivate a decision about what structures to rerycle and when.
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N.Ellis, 1993; Hulstijn, 1990) which develop rhe paradigm initiated by Reber(196e).
Important questions such research could address are the extent to
which changes in learning are consequent upon manipulations of assumed
variables like degree of attention, and intention (Curran & Keele, 1993;
Schmidt, 1,990, 1,992a). Other questions are prompted by the issue of
learnability, or more properly, learnableness. What, given these conditions,
can be learned? Are the conditions differentially sensitive to the degree of
complexity of the stimulus domain (Reber, 19g9) with ,rrore co'mple*
structures being learned faster, more robustly, and in a manner that permits
of greater generalization to similar structures, under implicit but not explicit
conditions? Is the notion of complexity to be motivated in terms of universal
Grammar ( Sharwood-Smith, 1991; White. 19g9), or in terms of processing
models like those of Frazier (1935, 19gS) and Smith (198g), or p.o""rsirrl
models supported by developmental evidence (Meisel, Clahsen, pienemann,
1981: Pienemann, Johnston & Brindley, 19gg)? Is learning under the two task
conditions differentially sensitive to individual differences in cognitive
capacities, with learning under implicit conditions being unaffected by such
differences, in contrast to learning under explicit conditions (Reber,
walkenfield, Hernstadt, 7991,)? rn a second language context this could
involve examining the contributions of individual differences in memory
capacity or inductive language learning abitity (see Skehan, 19g9) as
measured, for example, by subtests on aptitude batteries like the 'Modern
Language Aptitude Test' (Carroll & Sapon, 1959). Such a research program
would complement an approach to syllabus design that classifies and
sequences tasks in a task-based syllabus (Long & Crookes,7992) according to
their assumed complexity at the level of cognitive function (Robinson, 1993).
If complex tasks 'stretch' interlanguage (Long, 1989) it would be important to
know whether such task driven complexifications can benefit from an explicit
focus on form, and under what conditions, or whether some forms are better
left to implicit processes. However, before we can specify a clear a role for
implicit learning, or knowledge, in syllabus design, either structurally
organized or task-based, it will be necessary to investigate such matters
thoroughly, and with a clear idea of the relationship of the constructs we are
using to those used elsewhere in cognitive psychology.
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Fully And Partially Specified Models
Inferences are if then statements that relate level$ In Figure 2 inference 1 is an inference about
leaming which is based on differences in cognitive function as a consequence of behaviour
under iifferentlv specified task conditions. T'his assumes a theory at the level of cognitive
function. Infereice'2 is an inference about knowledge which is hotivated by phenomena
explained at the level of cognitive function, and requires a theory at the rePresentational level.
Inierence 3 is an inference Sbout the memory which is motivated by the claim about knowledge
and requires a theory at the neurophysiological level. Figure 3 shows the relation of inferences
to leveli when the ta'sk is a me-ory tisk, unider specified-direct or indirect conditions, Figure 4
shows how evidence at the neur6physiological level, for example from magnetic resonance
imaging can relate to inferences dt the oth--er levels. Figure 5 shows two Partially specified
modleliof relations between levels, and since these inferences are not related to sPecified task
conditiong or are related to fundamentally differently specified task conditions, then direct
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Shifftin & Schneider (1977): Mclaughtin (1987)
task condidons/specified
+controlled
+attention
+effortfrrl
-practice
-autosatic
-consistent
envlronment
transidon
Figure 10
